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ry impulses and reactions produced by the different economie 
sectors. The data thus collected were used to analyse moneta-
ry effects on economie development and to formulate monetary 
measures to counterbalance harmful effects, if necessary. The 
principles of this method will be elaborated in section 4. 
Section 5 will evaluate some findings. 
2. ZUM PROBLEM DES NEUTRALEN GELDES 
2.1 'Ideology' 
The neoclassical concept of general equilibrium and optimal 
welfare are also the basic assumptions Koopmans has chosen. 
According to these assumptions economie forces are always 
directed towards equilibrium when circumstances have led to 
disequilibrium. To Koopmans opinion the neutrality of money 
is one of the most effective means to have this disequilibri-
um restored as soon as posslble.2 He defined the concept of 
neutrality of money within the ideas of the neoclassical 
equilibrium theory:3 
'Neutral ist nach unserer Terminologie das Geld-
dann, und zwar nur dann wenn sëmtliche Vorgënge in 
den Geldwirtschaft óem Idealtypus einer reinen 
Tauschvirtschaft nach den Gesetzen den Gleichge-
vichtstheorien entsprechen.' 
Koopmans saw a strong relationship between the concepts of 
neutral money and laissez-faire. To his opinion planning, 
therefore, contradicted neutral money; only a quantitative 
policy of 'managed currency' could make money neutral again:* 
'es ist somit auch wohl von vorriherein einleuch-
tend, dass die Neutralit&t des Geldes sich über-
haupt nur bei grundsëtzlicher Anerkennung des soge-
nannten 'Laissez-faire' als das Hauptprinzip der 
2
 J.G. Koopmans, in Neutraal geld, p. 69. 
3
 J.G. Koopmans, in Neutraal geld, p. 279. 
4
 J.G. Koopmans, in Neutraal geld, p. 282. 
'tarnished' by Kimt Wicksell (1851-1926). He was interested 
In the short term effects of a change of the money supply. In 
hls opinion such a change could set in motlon cyclical move-
ments which In the long term would only lead to a change of 
absolute prices. Thus, in the long term there were no effects 
on production and employment. In the short term, though, 
there appeared to work a transmission mechanism between the 
monetary and real sectors.7 Other economists, notably F.A. 
von Hayek (born in 1899) and J.G. Koopmans (1900-1958) wanted 
to formulate conditions for the neutrality of money. They 
tried to find policy norms to neutralize the (cyclical) 
disturbances originating from the money sphere. It was Koop-
mans who proved that the old theoretical concepts could not 
be of help anymore in formulating the conditions of neutrali-
j -
In a moneyless economy Say's Law, i.e. supply and demand 
are equal, is true by definition. As soon as money enters the 
scène as an intermediary the number of transactions at least 
doubles: one has to sell a product for money and only then is 
able to exchange this for new products. That is why Say's Law 
is not necessarily valid anymore when money is involved, 
because in the circular flow of money and goods delays occur 
when one of the two kinds of transactions -supply and demand-
does not take place; the direct coherence between supply and 
demand has been broken and, according to Koopmans, as a 
consequence there is non-neutrality. This happens when money 
dissapears out of circulation; then there is supply of goods 
and services that does not meet demand. This situation Koop-
7
 Wicksell saw two ways of transmission; we will discuss them for a situation of increased 
money supply. Firstly, he mentioned direct transmission: decreasing marginal returns of money 
vis-a-vis goods would stimulate spending. And, secondh/, he mentioned indirect transmission: 
decreasing interest would result in a situation where enterprises of especially capital goods 
expect higher profits, which leads to increasing demand for raw materials and labour (at the cost 
of producers of consumers goods) and thus to increasing wages, spending and consumer prices. 
After a while decreasing bank reserves due to increased credits would force the banking system 
to decrease credits by increasing the interest. This would counterbalance the original upward 
cyclical movement due to the increased money supply. 
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He claimed that since by f ar the greater part of the changes 
of the money supply work out through the credit market, this 
market automatically would localize these changes.12 Then the 
macro-Instruments of discount policy and open market transac-
tions would suffice to compensate for the changes. 
Now, there still remained the problem of finding the 
compass for the course towards neutrality. Neoclassical 
economists tried to find this touchstone in the Quantity 
Theory. In 1911 this theory was reshaped by Irving Fisher 
(1867-1947) into the Equation of Exchange that stated that 
all payments in a certain period (MxV) and all trade during 
that same period (PxT) have the same value: MXV • PxT. In the 
equation M stands for the average size of the national stock 
of money during a unit of time and V for the transaction 
velocity of circulation of money, which is the same as the 
number of times a unit of money changes hand per unit of 
time. T is the volume of good purchased with money during the 
period of time and P is the price level. V and T are consi-
dered to be constant in the short term and independent from H 
in the long term. Thus, any increase of the money supply M 
will have to lead to a proportional change of the price level 
P. 
The Fisherian Equation of Exchange was used by other 
neoclassical economists to define monetary equilibrium. 
Wicksell among other things explained that P would be con-
stant in a situation of monetary equilibrium. Von Hayek 
stated that the condition of constant prices would not suffi-
ce.13 He considered a constant money supply as the detenni-
12
 J.G. Koopmans, in Neutraal geld, pp. 425-426. Changes of the supply of money due to 
changes of the supply of coins or gold, and the effects of counterfeiting are left aside. 
13
 He agreed with D. Davidson in this. Davidson (1854-1942) stated that technical progress 
would stimulate businessmen to borrow. This would have to be compensated either by price 
decreases of finished goods or by increasing the market interest See H. Visser, p. 190. 
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remained constant, M. However, as soon as V does not increa-
se enough -i.e the reactlon of sector A Is delayed which in 
the terminology of Koopmans means that this sector is hoar-
ding- M has to be increased as well to prevent 'reiner Nach-
frage-Ausfall. This implies that only in exceptional cir-
cumstances one of the Fisherian variables will be constant. 
The variables of the Eqtiation of Exchange therefore can not 
serve as a touchstone for monetary equilibrium.15 
Thus, Koopmans showed which economie variables could not be 
used as criterium; however, he could not think of a new one, 
much to hls regret. The matter of a policy compass for the 
course towards monetary equilibrium, therefore, still was not 
solved. Despite this f act, the ideas of Koopmans laid the 
foundation of Dutch post-war monetary policy and monetary 
analysis. 
2.3 Some comments by Dutch economists 
Essential for a monetary equilibrium is the adaptation of 
the effective quantity of money -i.e. money actually used as 
purchasing power- to the value of the flow of goods. This 
leads to the equation of prices and costs or savings and 
investments. However, there are so many changes in the flow 
of goods that a complete adaptation is virtually impossible, 
as Fosthuma has stated.16 Because there is a time lag, una-
dapted prices will exert influence on the course of the 
economie process, which implies that when prices have been 
adapted they have to change again. The influences of prices 
on the course of the economie process of course differ per 
economie sector so that an overall monetary equilibrium does 
not mean that prices do not exert any influence in separate 
sectors. This comment is an essential critique on the neo-
classical concept of general equilibrium Koopmans adhered to. 
Hennipman has made objections against the Identification of 
J.G. Koopmans, in Neutraal geld, pp. 349-380. 
S. Posthuma, in Analyses en beschouwingen in retrospect, pp. 553-555. 
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of money and goods. Thereby he aimed at a money supply that 
should not exert any influence on prlce changes ltself, which 
in fact is neutrality or monetary equilibrium. 
Table 1 - Dutch money supply during Vorld War Two (min Df1) 
paper giro money 
money accounts (a) supply 
end of August 1939 1.133 1.507 2.640 
end of April 1940 1.167 1.480 2.647 
end of April 1941 1.715 2.300 4.015 
end of April 1942 2.371 2.789 5.160 
end of April 1943 2.680 2.937 5.617 
end of April 1944 4.299 4.185 8.484 
end of April 1945 5.894 5.014 10.908 
Source: P. Lieftinck, Witboek, p. 11. 
a) This contains an estimate concerning the bank accounts 
at the smaller banks: they were glven a pre-war ratio of 
1.23 vis-è-vis the four largest banks. 
Lieftinck did not expect to reach this 'ideal situation', 
though, but he considered it to be a useful target.18 There-
f ore, the quantity of money had to be decreased so that 
demand for money and supply of money would be equal again: 
first of all, the money overhang had to be bound. When trans-
lated into a policy target, Lieftinck aimed at a nominal 
supply of money that was 50% of the nominal net national 
income at market prices. The nominal supply of money repre-
sented the demand for goods and services and national income 
represented the supply of money needed to produce national 
production. The difference between the two variables is 
explained by the transaction velocity V: money circulates and 
can be spent several times during one year, and in this case 
19
 P. Lieftinck, Witboek, p. 74. In his Inleiding tot de geldtheorie' published in 1946 
Lieftinck stated on page 11 that the condition of monetary neutrality, if taken stricüy, could not 
be fulfüled. Still, he decided to use the concept as a policy norm. In 'Pieter Lieftinck 1902-1989' 
( A A Bakker and M.M.P. van Lent) he explained that first of all he had wanted to reinforce 
die economie stracture and the productive capacity. In the Keynesian way he had accepted 
budgetary deficits as long as there was no full employment, and under the restriction of 
monetary equilibrium. 
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been completed In May 1945. Lleftlnck, therefore, declded 
only to block the use of bank and treasury notes of ƒ 100,-, 
whlch was about 25% of all paper money. The cut In the money 
supply was also meant to tackle black marketeers and collabo-
rators who were expected to have accumulated many denominati-
ons of ƒ 100,-, because thls denomlnatlon was the most Impor-
tant hlgh-valued bank note In clrculatlon. 
The preparations for the final blocklng of the rest of the 
denomlnatlons were slowed down by the slmple f act that new 
bank notes were not avallable yet. The flrst post-war govern-
ment dld lts best to stlmulate the production of new currency 
at home and abroad in order to advance the moment the next 
phase of the monetary reform could start. Meanwhile, all 
Dutchmen were stimulated to deposit their money, because only 
limited amounts could be accepted in a final week of handing 
in. During this week (19-25 September 1945) each Dutchman 
could exchange old money for ƒ 10,- in new paper money and on 
26 September all other denominations were declared void and 
the value of the money was blocked; all forms of monetary 
possessions and claims were also blocked, such as demand 
deposits, savings, other deposits and even securities. At 
that moment each Dutchman had a purchasing power of ten Dutch 
guilders which meant that the bank note circulation had been 
reduced to ƒ 90 million. 
On 26 September Lleftlnck also explained the main line of 
thought and the contents of the ministerial order in a radio 
speech. The principal idea behind the deblocking now to be 
started was to put an end to inflation by only living on 
current income. Af ter a few weeks of deblocking the circu-
lation of new money would have spread over the entire econo-
my, so that the selling of products and services would provi-
de the production and service sectors with enough financial 
means to finance their expenses without being dependent on 
deblocking anymore. For this purpose, the Central Bank was 
given permission to grant credits and general and special 
permits in order to give financial leeway to the business 
15 
transaction velocity of money V that is determined by the 
liquidity preference of the economie subjects, i.e the cash 
reserves they prefer. Secondly, there were the payments that 
are not really reflecting income. In order to calculate 
national income this problem can be solved by using the 
method of value added. Nevertheless, the more intra-business 
transactions are needed to make a product, the more money is 
generally needed to produce a certain value added. This is 
one of the exceptions Von Hayek mentioned that could justify 
an increase of the money supply. Thirdly, there were the 
payments that are not the result of current production, such 
as pensions, dividends, money from insurance policies, and 
rents). These payments necessitate a higher money volume than 
needed for a monetary equilibrium, at least at first instan-
ce; through demand they will create income at the second 
instance and thus become part of the circular flow. 
The application of the principle of a money flow linked 
with production also implicated that cash reserves accumula-
ted in the business sector during the war such as write-offs 
against depreciation and the non-replaceraent of used up means 
of production could not be released: funds for new invest-
ments would have to be earned again or corapensated by new 
savings.22 This could implicate that when the desired money 
supply had been reached no more money would be deblocked for 
investment purposes, nor for any other purpose, unless the 
deblocked liquidity resulted in a quick increase of producti-
on. To prevent this situation to become reality the State 
therefore had to refrain from deficit financing other than 
from money already in circulation, nor could it recirculate 
blocked money paid to it, such as payments of tax arrears 
(indirect deblocking). 
In the beginning of 1946 the money supply had increased too 
much, according to the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, de-
P. Lieftinck, Witboek, p. 77. 
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116 million In 1949) which leads to an overall effect of 
approximately 15% on the ratio of ntoney supply and national 
income at the end of 1949. 
Table 2 shows that the ratio of money supply and national 
income had decreased to 45% in 1949 which is 5% below the 50% 
Table 2 - Money supply and national income (min Dfl) 
Money supply(a) national Ratio of money 
(12-months income supply and 
average) national income 
1938 2.480(b) 5.400 46 
1945(May) 10.232 3.000(c) 300-400(c) 
1945(Dec) 4.572 8.000(c) 51(c) 
1946 5.410 9.930 54 
1947 6.470 12.070 54 
1948 7.190 14.230 51 
1949 7.180 15.970 45.0 
1950 7.160 17.740 40.4 
1951 6.880 19.550 35.2 
1952 7.550 20.420 37.0 
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank, Jaarverslagen (Annual 
reports, 1946 and 1953-1956. 
(a) Coins , notes and demand deposits 
(b) Average of the beginning and the end of the year. 
(c) Estimated level (source P. Lieftinck, Het Neder-
landse financiële herstel 1945-1952, p. 167. 
Lieftinck had aimed at. This was mainly due to increased 
production. Yet, there was no stable monetary equilibrium. 
There proved to be a large pent-up demand which could turn 
loose if imports would be liberalized, as the negative balan-
ce of payments position of the Netherlands indicated. So f ar 
consumption and imports, and thereby production, had been 
hampered by rationing and import restrictions. Nonetheless, 
the remaining balance of payments deficit, due to the recon-
struction effort, could hardly be covered.25 Recovery, there-
Foreign credits (1946-1948: ƒ 1.8 billion), liquidation of private foreign possessions of 
Dutchmen (1946-1948: ƒ L5 billlion) and eating into gold reserves (1947-1948: ƒ 700 million) 
were needed to finance the import surplus until the Marshall Aid had started in the last months 
of 1948 (ƒ 600 million). See F. Lieftinck, Het Nederlandse finandële herstel 1945-1952, p. 178. 
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(year ultimo), while natlonal Incorae Increased by ƒ 1750 
mllllon (see Table 2). Thls Indlcates the dlshoardlng of 
money and an increase of the transactlon veloclty of circula-
tlon of money V. In 1951 the cycllcal economie development 
turned around which resulted In a balance of payments surplus 
for the flrst time during the post-war period, especlally due 
to Increased exports! Now, the unstable monetary equillbrlum 
had changed Into a much more s tab Ie one: short-term govern-
ment debt had decreased sübstantlally (blocked money Inclu-
ded) and pent-up demand had vanlshed. 
4 APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MONETARY EQÜILIBRIÜM ON A 
SECTORAL BASIS 
4.1 Analysls by the Nederlandsche Bank 
The 1947 annual report the Dutch central bank analyses the 
development of the money supply sector by sector for the 
flrst time, thereby applylng one of Koopmans Ideas. The Bank 
dlstlngulshed slx different economie sectors: 1) central 
goverament, 2) local government, 3) llquldity creatlng finan-
cial instltutlons, 4) Instltutlonal investors and other 
funds, 5) private individuals and trade and industry, and 6) 
foreign countries, regarding the balance of payments surplus 
or deficit as the natlonal llquldity surplus or deficit. The 
purpose of this analysls was to locate deflatlonary and 
inflationary developments and to measure these so as to 
provide the Nederlandsche Bank with data to base its policy 
on. The Bank was mainly interested in the way demand for 
goods and services was financed. It thereby applied the same 
notions as Koopmans did, making distinction between inflatio-
nary financing (llquldity creation and hoarding) and defla-
tlonary financing (llquldity extinction and dlshoardlng).29 
Since 1951 the Central Bank applied the concept of primaiy and secondary liquidities 
instead of only analysing the supply of primary liquidities (cash and demand deposits). This was 
due to the amount of secondary liquidity that was issued by the State in the 1940s. 
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impulse.31 
In the annual report of 1953 the method of clrcumstantlal 
evldence is clearly elaborated.32 We will use this elaborati-
on as an example. Banking statistics showed a liquidity 
surplus of the government sector, 'institutional investors 
and other funds', and 'individuals and trade and industry' 
which implied that there was hoarding and a f all in liquidi-
ty. This observation in itself did not explain the character 
of the deflationary influence: was it an (autonomous) defla-
tionary impulse or an (induced) deflationary reaction? Cir-
cumstantial evidence, in this case, indicated a mild inflati-
onary economy. This implied that there could not have been 
large inflationary impulses. Therefore, the liquidity surplus 
had to be a deflationary impulse instead of a deflationary 
reaction on inflationary impulses. The same motivation was 
used for 'institutional investors and other funds'. With 
regard to 'private individuals and trade and industry' the 
interpretation was more complicated, because there was hoar-
ding of primary liquidities (ƒ 500 million), dishoarding of 
secondary liquidities (ƒ 40 million) and money creation 
through credits (ƒ 200 million) at the same time. Thus, on 
the whole inflationary influences exercised by 'individuals 
and trade and industry' were less than the deflationary 
influences. Given the f act that the accumulation of primary 
liquidities parallelled the increase of national income, the 
Nederlandsche Bank interpreted the deflationary influences as 
a reaction and not as an impulse. This reaction could only 
have resulted from inflationary impulses exercised by the 
foreign countries, because there were no such disturbances 
originating from the other Dutch economie sectors. This 
analysis led to the conclusions that the continuing cyclical 
31
 Circumstantial evidence was also needed for the interpretation of the balance of 
payments surplus (or deficit). A surplus, for example, could be just as well a reaction to Dutch 
deflationary impulses as that it could be the measure of inflationary impulses from abroad. 
Jaarverslag van de Nederlandsche Bank over 1953, pp. 60-68. 
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only of theoretical use; It had been helpful in coming to 'a 
sound and fruitf ui relationship' with the Treasury, because 
this was based on the principles of the method of analysis we 
have just set out (see the Appendix). 
4.2 Towards an econometrie model 
Later in the 1950s Holtrop himself developed an econometrie 
model of analysis in cooperation with his associate G.A. 
Kessler. This stylized version of the impulse analysis con-
tains only two equations:35 
D - kAY - B 
B - E - mAY o E - mAY + B 
In the first equation we recognize the ideas set forward in 
the Equation of Exchange as formulated by the Cambridge 
School and in the concept of monetary equilibrium. The inter-
nal, domestic impulse D is the sum total of newly created and 
dishoarded liquidity that increases Y (calculated on a yearly 
basis) until the stimulus has been absorbed. This, in effect, 
is the difference between 1) the increase of normal liquidity 
balances (kAY), and 2) the balance of payments surplus (or 
deficit) B. B represents the difference between the exteraal 
impulses (foreign demand) and Dutch import demand (mAY). mAY 
is the reraainder of the created and dishoarded or activated 
liquidity, under the assumption that normal behaviour requi-
res that surplus cash will be spent or invested. m stands for 
the normal quota of external expenditure (estimated at 0.5) 
while k represents the normal cash quota (assessed at 0.4); 
this is the average supply of money as a fraction of nominal 
national income Lieftinck wanted to be 0.5 in the 1940s.36 
Put to the test statistically the model is 'by no means 
void of economie relevance', as the main Dutch critic of the 
35
 M.W. Holtrop, in Money in an Open Economy, p. 163. 
36
 M.W. Holtrop, Money in an Open Economy, p. 161. The model needs the input of data 
about national income, balance of payments surplus or deficit, net domestic creation of liquidity 
by governmental institutions and private sector, and activation of liquidity by the local govern-
ments. 
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the period under consideration. He clained that the intro-
duction of time lags would 'greatly complicate calculations 
without affecting results over a longer period'.*x This 
implied that all effects of a changed liquidity supply would 
be absorbed by AY in the period under consideration. This 
probably was a consequence of the purpose of the analysls: 
publication in the annual reports of the Nederlandsche Bank. 
Selden's alternative model used data of three previous years, 
which is not interesting for an analysls that is based on 
year to year circumstances. 
We have done a simple research ourselves by comparing data 
about internal impulses gathered with the original monetary 
analysls (method 1) and data about these impulses calculated 
with the help of the model itself (method 2). The imputation 
of the domestic inflationary impulse D to only two sectors 
shows that there are big differences, especially with regard 
to activation of liquidity by the (non-liquidity creating) 
private sector (see Table 3). In method 2 the impulses caused 
by the private sector are the remainder of the domestic 
Table 3 - Comparlson of methods applied by M.W. Holtrop (min Dfl) 
Internal impulses 
(+ - inflationary) 
1951 
meth. 1 meth. 2 
1952 
meth. 1 meth. 2 
1953 
meth. 1 meth. 2 
•liquidity creation 
l.government + 190 
2.private sector + 140 
•liquidity activation 
1. government - 50 
2.private sector - 60 
20 
160 
40 
800 
- 810 
+ 220 
340 
740 
- 830 
+ 150 
- 360 
- 530 
- 780 
+ 290 
240 
740 
- 870 
+ 50 
+ 220 
+ 230 
Sources: Jaarverslag (annual report) of the Nederlandsche Bank, 
1953, p. 61 
M.W. Holtrop, in Nationale monetaire vraagstukken 2, p. 
141 
M.W. Holtrop, Money in an Open Economy, p. 163, footnote. 
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before the Second World War.*2 In reallty the pre-war ratio 
had. never been higher than 46%. Lieftinck later admitted that 
the 50%-norm had been too high. This did not worry him 
though, because, as he stated, the transaction velocity of 
circulation of money V 'might have been slowed down at least 
until the end of 1948, due to limitations imposed on consump-
tion and investment which hindered the quick spending of 
income'.*3 According to Lieftinck this slowdown 'may have 
compensated the effects on prices by the high volume of money 
M'.** Lieftinck could have been right for one more reason, 
because there was distrust against the blocked demand depo-
sits as a raeans of payment. This manifested itself in the 
hoarding of cash, in accordance with Gresham's Law. Demand 
deposits (giro money) were the 'bad' money, used for payments 
as much as possible, thus driving out 'good' money (cash). 
Some Dutchmen, such as black marketeers and farmers, market 
gardeners, petty traders and wholesalers were simply only 
interes ted in cash and hoarded it. The f act that the bank 
secrecy had been abandoned and that the tax authorities had 
been given much liberty will have stimulated the keeping at 
home of cash for transaction purposes and as (secret) sa-
vings, because this could not easily be controlled by the 
fiscal authorities. The distrust may have lasted until late 
in the 1940s when most of the war taxes were paid off and the 
black market disappeared due to an increasing supply of 
goods. The consequence of this was that much cash did not 
really circulate in the economy and was hoarded. Thus, some 
sectors of the economy had to make more requests for debloc-
king than necessary considering the supply of money. Further-
more, not all branches of industry and trade had started off 
at the same time and with the same pace. This also necessita-
42
 P. Lieftinck, Witboek, p. 75. 
43
 P. Lieftinck, Het Nederlandse financiële herstel 1945-1952, p. 168. 
44
 P. Lieftinck, ibid. 
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